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limitations for negligence actions 20 was applicable and had already
run. The court held that an "action for indemnity is based upon
principles of a quasi contract and is governed by the six-year period
of limitations ... as distinguished from the 'action to recover damages for a personal injury.' "21 This holding is in accord with and
reaffirms prior case law.2 2 It has always been the rule, in the
impleader context, that the indemnity cause of action does not "accrue" until the actual payment by the third party plaintiff of a judgment recovered against it on the cause of action stated in the com2 3
plaint.

Thus, under Section 1007 of the CPLR, 24 a third party

complaint is actually served even before the cause of action it pleads
(indemnity) accrues. This carries forward the prior impleader
practice, which is designed to avoid a multiplicity of actions.
Statute of limitations continues to run as to co-partner who
has not been personally served.
First Nat'l City Bank v. Cervera&5 involved an action against
co-partner Cervera on a note executed by him and the partnership
as co-makers.2
In January 1954, there was a default on a payment, and the entire note immediately became due and payable. In
May 1954, co-partner Pedretti was personally served, and in July
1954, a judgment by default was entered against him and the partnership for the entire outstanding obligation. However, only a
small sum was collected on that judgment. In July 1963, approximately nine years after the cause of action had accrued, defendant
Cervera was properly served. Defendant pleaded the statute of
limitations under CPLR 213, claiming that the six years had run.
The civil court 27 granted defendant's motion for summary judgment,28 pointing out that the defendant could raise every defense
that he could have asserted in the first action on the note, as well
as any that may have arisen since the judgment against the partnership had been entered.2 9 Since the present action had not been
20CPLR
214(5).
2
1-lansen v. City of New York, spra note 19, at 696.
22 E.g., Sheftman v. Balfour Housing Corp., 219 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct.
1961); Smith v. Smucker, 100 N.Y.S.2d 35 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
23 Satta v. City of New York, 272 App. Div. 782, 69 N.Y.S.2d 653
(2d Dep't 1947).
24 This was also the practice under § 193-a(1) of the CPA.
25252 N.Y.S.2d 537 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1964).
26 Section 26 of the Partnership Law makes each partner jointly and
severally liable, while the note in question does the same.
27The advance sheet (252 N.Y.S.2d 537), in which the case appears,
erroneously states that it was rendered by the "Municipal Court." This court
was abolished on September 1, 1962.
28 CPLR 3212.
29CPLR 1502.
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commenced within six years after the accrual of the cause of action,
the defense of the statute of limitations was an effective bar.
The holding in the instant case recognizes that service upon
one partner is effective only as against the partner personally served
and the jointly held partnership property. In order to hold an
individual partner personally liable, service must be made on him.
Since the defendant here had not been personally served in the first
action, the judgment entered therein could only affect the value of
his partnership interest, not his personal assets. The twenty-year
period of limitations applicable to a money judgment 30 was not
discussed, apparently because the court felt that it did not apply, no
personal judgment against the individual defendant having been
obtained.
ARTICLE 3 -JURISDICTION

AND SnRvcE, APPEARANCE AND CHOICE
OF COURT

CPLR 302 being liberally construed to expand jurisdictional
bases in actions against non-domiciliaries.
Section 30131 of the CPLR has retained the bases of jurisdiction which existed under the CPA and former case law. By the
enactment of the "longarm" statute, section 302,'3 the legislature has
greatly broadened the state's bases of in personam jurisdiction.
Before the enactment of section 302(a) (1), a foreign corporation could not be considered "present" for jurisdictional purposes
unless it had systematic and regular contacts with New York, i.e.,
the corporation had to be doing business here.3 3 As Judge Cardozo
stated: "if it is here, not occasionally or casually, but with a fair
continuity, then . . . it is within the
measure of permanence and
3' 4
jurisdiction of our courts.
In 1945, the Supreme Court of the United States relaxed the
former demands of due process and went beyond the "presence"
test, holding that due process requires only that the defendant have
so CPLR 211(b).

31 CPLR 301. A court may exercise such jurisdiction over persons, property, or status as might have been exercised heretofore.
32 CPLR 302(a): "A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any
non-domiciliary . . . as to a cause of action arising from any of the acts
enumerated in this section . . . if, in person or through an agent, he:
1. transacts any business within the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state . . . or
3. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state."
33 See, e.g., Miller v. Surf Properties, Inc., 4 N.Y.2d 475, 151 N.E.2d 874,
176 N.Y.S.2d 318 (1958); Elish v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 305 N.Y. 267,
112 N.E.2d 842 (1953) ; Sterling Novelty Corp. v. Frank & Hirsch Distrib.

Co., 299 N.Y. 208, 86 N.E.2d 564 (1949).

34 Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 267, 115 N.E. 915, 917
(1917).

